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AMERICA AT WAR THE LEGAL ISSUES 
The War On Terrorism 
And The Constitution 
by Michael I. Meyerson 
Discussion of civil liberties during wartime often omit the 
fact that there can be no meaningful liberty at all if our 
homes and offices are bombed or our loved ones are killed 
or injured by acts of terror. The Government must be giv-
en the tools necessary to accomplish its vital mission. The 
first priority must be to win the war against terrorism. There 
are, however, other priorities. The United States, in its just 
battle for freedom, must ensure that freedom is preserved 
during that battle as well. And achieving both goals is not 
always easy. 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist is fond of quoting Abra-
ham Lincoln's dismissal of judicial criticism over Lincoln's 
unilateral suspension of Habeas Corpus at the beginning 
of the Civil War. Chief Justice Roger Taney, riding circuit, 
had held the suspension of Habeas Corpus was solely a leg-
islative determination. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 
(D.Md. 1861). Thus, he held, Lincoln's actions were uncon-
stitutional, and the arrests sanctioned by them were illegal. 
In ignoring the court's decree, Lincoln declared that the 
greater good must be served and that the necessities of war 
overrode specific rights: 
Must [all law] be allowed to finally fail of execution, 
even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the 
means necessary to their execution some single law, 
made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liber-
ty that practically it relieves more of the guilty than of 
the innocent, should to a very limited extent be vio-
lated? To state the question more directly, are all the 
laws but one to go unexecuted and the Government it-
self go to pieces lest that one be violated? 
Abraham Lincoln, ''Message to Congress, July 4, 1861 " in 
The Official Records of the Ullion alld Confederate Annies, Series 
IV, I, 311-321. 
The limitation of Lincoln's reasoning, though, is that it 
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creates a false dichotomy: The complete destruction of our 
system of government which can be prevented if a "single 
law" which is made in "extreme tenderness of the citizen's 
liberty" and is violated to only a "very limited extent." 
In the real world, though, it is not necessarily obvious 
that the violation of the single law is either necessary or 
helpful in ensuring the nation's security. Also, the doctrine 
espoused by Lincoln has no obvious stopping point, no 
way to determine how many or how fundamental are the 
laws which the Government may violate in the name of 
national security. 
An important example is the internment of more than 
120,000 Japanese-Americans during World War II. The 
Supreme Court upheld this action, declaring: 
[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the 
military authorities and of Congress that there were 
disloyal members of that population, whose number 
and strength could not be precisely and quickly as-
certained. We cannot say that the war-making branch-
es of the Government did not have ground for believing 
that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be 
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a 
menace to the national defense and safety, which de-
manded that prompt and adequate measures be taken 
to guard against it. 
Korematsu v. United States,323 U.S. 214,218 (1944). 
Many years later, though, it was revealed that this "judg-
ment of military authorities" was quite suspect. The con-
clusions were largely those of one person, Lieutenant 
General John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the 
Western Defense Command, who was responsible for 
West Coast security. Every entity responsible for advis-
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ing him, the FBI, the FCC, and Naval In-
telligence, found that there was no such 
threat, and that, in the words of Com-
mander Kenneth D. Ringle, an expert 
on Japanese intelligence in the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, "the entire 'Japanese 
Problem' has been magnified out of its 
true proportion, largely because of the 
physical characteristics of the peo-
ple; .. .it is no more serious than the 
problems of the German, Italian, and 
Communistic portions of the United 
States population." Evidence also 
emerged that DeWitt's decision was mo-
tivated in no small part by racial ani-
mus. He was to declare that "racial 
affinities are not severed by migration," 
and in an off-the-record interview, "[AJ 
Jap is a Jap." Hohri v. United States, 586 
F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984). 
One lesson of history is that the mere 
declaration of military necessity does not 
necessarily justify the infringement of civil 
liberties. Justice Robert Jackson warned 
that great skepticism was required when 
Government utilized its so-called "war 
~~ 
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power" to justify actions: 
It usually is invoked in haste and ex-
citement when calm legislative con-
sideration of constitutional 
limitation is difficult. It is executed 
in a time of patriotic fervor that 
makes mooeration unpopular. And, 
worst of all, it is interpreted by 
judges under the influence of the 
same passions and pressures. Al-
ways ... the Government urges hasty 
decision to forestall some emer-
gency or serve some purpose and 
pleads that paralysis will result if its 
claims to power are denied or their 
confirmation delayed. 
Particularly when the war power is 
invoked to do things to the liberties 
of people, or to their property or 
economy that only indirectly affect 
conduct of the war and do not relate 
to the management of the war itself, 
the constitutional basis should be 
scrutinized with care. 
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 
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146-47 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
Are We Really At War? 
It is sometimes very easy to tell when ~ 
this nation is at war. The day after Pearl 
Harbor was bombed, for example, Con-
gress passed a joint resolution stating, 
'''That the state of war between the United 
States and the Imperial Government of 
Japan which has thus been thrust upon 
the United States is hereby formally de-
clared ... " However, such formal decla-
rations are rare in American history. The 
only others occurred during the War of 
1812, the Mexican-American War (1848), 
the Spanish-American War (1898), and 
World War I. 
Most of the more than 100 military ac-
tions undertaken by the United States 
during the course of our history lacked 
such a declaration. They have been ac-
companied either by Congressional au-
thorization for the use of force without a 
formal declaration (as with Desert Storm 
and, perhaps, the Vietnam War); Con-
gressional funding without actual au-
thorization (such as the Korean War); or 
Congressional silence (as with the inva-
sion of Grenada in 1983). 
Knowing whether we are currently "at 
war" and against whom, is important for 
not only determining the legality of the 
military operations but also the conse-
quential changes in legal rights and re-
sponsibilities that follow when our nation 
is at war. 
Before analyzing the current situa-
tion, it is useful to recall that, while the 
Constitution provides that the President 
is "Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States," (Art. II, 
Sec. 2), it is Congress which has the 
power "to declare war." (Art. I, Sec. 8). 
To the framers, this was a vitally im-
portant distinction. During the debates 
at the Constitutional Convention, James 
Madison proposed the final language, 
changing the original draft which would 
have authorized Congress to "make 
war." The purpose of the change was 
"leaving to the Executive the power to 
repel sudden attacks." As Roger Sher-
man of Connecticut stated, "The Exec-
utive should be able to repel and not to 
commence war." 
Thus, it is the task of the President to 
act, unilaterally if necessary, to oppose 
"sudden attacks," but otherwise the de-
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cision to begin a war rests with Con-
gress. The reason for this was the 
framers' well-founded distrust of mbn-
, archs and other leaders who carry their 
people into unwise conflict. As James 
Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson, 
"The constitution supposes, what the 
History of all Governments demon-
strates, that the Executive is the branch 
of power most interested in war, & most 
prone to it. It has accordingly with stud-
ied care, vested the question of war in 
the Legislature." 
The exclusive power of Congress to 
"commence" war may not be implicat-
ed, however, when others have already 
declared war on the United States. At 
the birth of our Republic, the Barbary pi-
rates attacked the ships of nations which 
did not pay protection money, known 
then as "tribute." After Thomas Jeffer-
son became President in 1801, he 
stopped such payments, and the ruler 
of Tripoli (the "dey") declared war on 
the United States. Jefferson sent war 
ships to the Mediterranean, which were 
then attacked by a Tripolitan ship. After 
the American frigates prevailed in bat-
tle, the enemy ship was disarmed and 
released. Jefferson explained to Congress 
that the reason the ship was not captured 
was that, since Congress had not de-
clared war, the rules of war permitting 
such capture did not apply. (Thomas Jef-
ferson: First Annual Message to Con-
gress, December 8,1801) 
Alexander Hamilton mocked Jeffer-
son's highly fonna listic analysis as an "ab-
surdity" which was "so repugnant to 
good sense, so inconsistent with nation-
al safety ... " (Alexander Hamilton, The 
Examination, no. 1, Dec. 17, 1801). Hamil-
ton argued that the Congressional pow-
er to declare war meant that, when our 
nation was at peace, only Congress could 
change it to a state of war. But, he stated, 
"when a foreign nation declares, or open-
ly and avowedly makes war upon the 
United States, they are then by the very 
fact, already at war, and any declaration 
on the part of Congress is nugatory: it is 
at least unnecessary." 
Under Hamilton's analysis, it could 
well be argued that no declaration of 
war was necessary at all after Septem-
ber 11 to combat the terrorists who 
planned and launched the attack. As if 
this attack were not sufficient by itself 
MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL 
to initiate a state of war, Osama bin Lan-
den had previously declared war 
against the United States; in 1998, he 
called for the killing of American civil-
ians as well as soldiers, "in any country 
in which it is possible to do it." 
One puzzling aspect is that the War on 
Terrorism is not waged against a partic-
ular nation. Nonetheless, it is certainly 
possible to be in a state of war that is not 
so directed. As the Supreme Court held 
in finding that the country was in a state 
of war during the Civil War, "it is not nec-
essary to constitute war, that both parties 
should be acknowledged as independent 
nations or sovereign States." The Brig Amy 
Warwick [The Prize Cases], 67 U.s. 635 
(1862). Thus, the Congressional autho-
rization of force was arguably not neces-
sary to create a state of war between the 
United States and those behind 
September 11. What is noteworthy about 
that authorization, though, is that it may 
be read as a specific limitation on the Pres-
ident's authority. 
On September 15, 2001, Congress ap-
proved a joint resolution which declared, 
That the president is authorized to use 
all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, autho-
rized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on Sept. 11,2001, 
or harbored such organizations or per-
sons, in order to prevent any future acts 
of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organiza-
tions or persons. Authorization for Use 
of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 11 
Stat. 224 (2001). 
Even though this does not contain a 
formal declaration of war, it certainly 
should be seen as resolving any linger-
ing doubt about military action against 
those who planned, carried out, or har-
bored those involved in September 11. 
What is significant is that this autho-
rization is explicitly not a blank check 
for a generalized "war on terrorism." 
According to The Baltimore Sun, Con-
gress rejected White House language 
which would have permitted the pres-
ident to initiate military action against 
terrorists not linked to the attacks of Sep-
tember 11. (Karen Hosler, "Congress en-
dorses the use of force," Baltimore Sun 
September 15, 2001, at lA) The plain lan-
guage of the resolution confirms the 
statement of Senator John Kerry (D-
Mass.) that while the resolution gave the 
President broad authority to retaliate 
against those associated with Septem-
ber 11, it did withhold authorization for 
a military attack on "any self-defined ter-
rorist group that you simply don't want 
to see around anymore." 
Accordingly, the attack on the Taliban 
in Afghanistan was a military action un-
dertaken pursuant both to Congressional 
authorization, and the inherent powers 
of the President as Commander-in-Chief 
to respond to a state of war declared by 
an adversary. By contrast, unless new in-
formation surfaces linking Iraq to Sep-
tember 11, the much-discussed invasion 
of Iraq would not appear authorized. Ini-
tiating a preemptive strike would seem 
to be just the sort of action to "commence" 
a conflict which the framers entrusted 
only to Congress. 
Emergency Powers and Civil Liberties 
After September 11, the Executive 
Branch claimed broad powers for deal-
ing with those it believed either were ter-
rorists or were assisting terrorists. First, 
it claimed the right to try non-citizens 
before a military tribunal, with rules far 
different from normal criminal trials. 
Next, it asserted the right to categorize 
both citizens and non-citizens as "ene-
my combatants." The significance of this 
label, according to the Government, is 
that it permits the Government to hold 
even citizens indefinitely without charg-
ing them with a crime and without ac-
cess to a lawyer. 
The military has used special tribunals 
since the Revolutionary War. Major John 
Andre, Adjutant-General to the British 
Army, and co-conspirator with Benedict 
Arnold, was tried by a "Board of General 
Officers" appointed by General Wash-
ington. He was found guilty of spying 
and hanged on October 2,1780. The first 
fonnal military tribunals were established 
by General Winfield Scott during the 
Mexican-American War in 1848. 
The Civil War saw extensive use of 
these tribunals, highlighted by two in-
teresting Supreme Court decisions. In the 
first, Ex Parte Val/andigham, 68 U.S. 243 
(1863), the Court refused to disturb the 
conviction of former Ohio congressman 
Clement Vallandigham "for having ut-
tered, in a speech at a public meeting, dis-
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loyal sentiments and opinions ... " The 
Court stated that it had no power to "re-
view or reverse ... the proceedings of a 
military commission." 
A few years later, the Supreme Court 
overturned the death sentence imposed 
by a military tribunal against Lamdin P. 
Milligan for "conspiracy against the Unit-
ed States," and freed the prisoner. Ex Parte 
Milligan,71 U.S. 2 (1866). The Court ruled 
that neither the laws of war nor the au-
thority of military tribunals could be "ap-
plied to citizens in states which have 
upheld the authority of the government, 
and where the courts are open and their 
process unobstructed." 
The most relevant cases for the current 
situation come from the Second World 
War, and show both the strengths and 
weaknesses of military tribunals. The first 
case, Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), in-
volved eight saboteurs, trained at a "sab-
otage school" near Berlin. They landed 
on the shores of the United States, four in 
Florida and four in New York, discard-
ed their uniforms, put on civilian clothes, 
and hid their cache of explosives and in-
cendiary devices. They were captured be-
fore they could execute their plan to blow 
up war industries and war facilities. 
President Roosevelt appointed a Mil-
itary Commission and directed it to try 
the eight saboteurs for offenses against 
the law of war (Order of July 2, 1942, 7 
Fed. Reg. 5103 (1942». The Court upheld 
the use of the military tribunals. First, 
the Court said that it was appropriate to 
term the saboteurs "unlawful combat-
ants": "[T]hose who during time of war 
pass surreptitiously from enemy terri-
tory into our own, discarding their uni-
forms upon entry, for the commission 
of hostile acts involving destruction of 
life or property, have the status of un-
lawful combatants punishable as such 
by military commission." 
Next, the Court stated that the fact that 
one of the saboteurs may have been a 
U.S. citizen was irrelevant: "Citizens 
who associate themselves with the mil-
itary arm of the enemy government, and 
with its aid, guidance and direction en-
ter this country bent on hostile acts, are 
enemy belligerents ... " 
Two of the saboteurs who cooperated 
were sentenced to jail. The other six were 
executed three days after the Tribunal an-
20 
nounced its sentence. 
Considering the nature of the offense 
and the status of the war in 1942, the out-
come of Quirin seems reasonable. By con-
trast, another tribunal case, In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.s. 1 (1946), shows the 
perils of such tribunals. 
Tomoyuki Yamashita was the Com-
manding General of the Japanese Army 
in the Philippines. After surrendering 
to the Americans, he was charged with 
violating the laws of war by permitting 
his soldiers to commit atrocities against 
the civilian population. He was con-
victed by a military tribunal and sen-
tenced to death. 
Although the Supreme Court upheld 
the tribunal, two Justices, Frank Murphy 
and Wiley B. Rutledge, delivered 
poignant dissents which reveal the dan-
gers of tribunals. They made the follow-
ing observations: 
1) The charge against Yamashita 
was improper. He was charged with 
failure to control his troops, but such 
control was made impossible by the 
American attack of the Philippines: 
"To use the very inefficiency and dis-
organization created by the victorious 
forces as the primary basis for con-
demning officers of the defeated 
armies bears no resemblance to justice 
or to military reality." 
2) He was given inadequate time to 
prepare. On the day of arraignment, 
October 8, three weeks before the trial 
began, petitioner was served with a bill 
of particulars specifying 64 items set-
ting forth a vast number of atrocities 
and crimes allegedly committed by 
troops under his command. Three days 
before trial, on October 26, the prose-
cution filed a supplemental bill of par-
ticulars, containing 59 more 
specifications. The tribunal denied re-
peated defense requests for a continu-
ance, even though the attorneys [all 
military personnel] had been "working 
day and night," with "no time what-
soever to prepare any affirmative de-
fense," as they had been fully occupied 
trying "to keep up with that new Bill 
of Particulars." 
3) The rules of evidence violated all 
principles of fundamental fairness. 
The only evidence the tribunal heard 
concerning Yamashita's knowledge 
of the atrocities was in the form of ex 
parte affidavits and depositions. He 
was never given the opportunity to 4 
cross-examine any witness on this 
crucial issue. 
The tribunal was permitted to admit 
any evidence "as in its opinion would 
be of assistance in proving or disprov-
ing the charge ... [or] would have pro-
bative value in the mind of a reasonable 
man." The tribunal was also free to de-
termine what weight to give any of the 
evidence received without restraint. 
What followed was a cascade of hearsay, 
second and third-hand reports, and even 
an army "propaganda film." In the 
words of Justice Rutledge, "[P]etitioner 
has been convicted of a crime in which 
knowledge is an essential element, with 
no proof of knowledge other than what 
would be inadmissible in any other cap-
ital case or proceeding under our sys-
tem, civil or military ... " 
There are several important lessons for 
our current situations. First, military tri-
bunals come with a price in terms of re-
liability and fairness. Especially when 
our civil and criminal courts are func-
tioning, we should be reluctant to relin-
quish the protections of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment. After all, the Gov-
ernment was able to conduct trials of 
both Timothy McVeigh and the terror-
ists who, in 1993, detonated a bomb in 
the World Trade Center. 
Second, it is indisputable that the 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review 
Government claims as to who is a com-
batant properly subject to military tri-
bunals. In arguing that Yaser Esam 
Hamdi (a U.s. citizen who was found 
among captured Taliban prisoners held 
at the Guantanamo Bay) should not be 
permitted to see a lawyer, the Govern-
ment made the extraordinary claim that 
the court was not empowered to review 
at all the Government's designation of 
an American citizen as an enemy com-
batant: "Given the constitutionally lim-
ited role of the courts in reviewing 
military decisions, courts may not sec-
ond-guess the military's determination 
that an individual is an enemy combat-
ant and should be detained as such." 
Hamdi v Rumsfeld, _ F.3d _ (4th Cir. 
July 12, 2002). 
Similar claims repeatedly have been 
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rejected by the Court. While granting 
great deference to the President, the 
Supreme Court in Quirin declared, 
"[N]either the [President's] Proclama-
tion nor the fact that they are enemy 
aliens forecloses consideration by the 
courts of petitioners' contentions that 
the Constitution and laws of the Unit-
ed States constitutionally enacted 
forbid their trial by military commis-
sion." As Justice Murphy observed in 
Yamashita, the Court assumed jurisdic-
tion to hear the claim: "Thus the ob-
noxious doctrine asserted by the 
Government in this case, to the effect 
that restraints of liberty resulting from 
military trials of war criminals are po-
litical matters completely outside the 
arena of judicial review, has been 
rejected fully and unquestionably." 
Concluding Thoughts 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist has 
apparently adopted much of the war-
time philosophy of Abraham Lincoln. In 
fact, he chose Lincoln's phrase "All the 
Laws but One," as the title for his book 
on civil liberties during times of war. In 
a recent speech, Rehnquist reviewed cas-
es from both the Civil War and World 
War II and noted that in both conflicts, 
"The courts, for their part, have largely 
reserved the decisions favoring civil lib-
erties in wartime to be handed down af-
ter the war was over." To lawyers and 
judges, this may seem a thoroughly un-
desirable state of affairs, but in the greater 
scheme of things it may be best for all con-
cerned." Remarks of Supreme Court Chief 
Justice William A. Rehnquist, Director's Fo-
rum, Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, November 17, 1999. 
Cases such as Ex Parte Vallandigham 
and Korematsu v. United States occurred 
during war-time. Meanwhile, cases such 
as Ex Parte Milligan (holding that the mil-
itary cannot substitute its tribunals for 
civil courts which are able to function) 
and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 
(1946) (same), occurred after the end of 
the conflict. 
The Chief Justice may be overlooking 
a more recent trend, which indicates that 
war-time courts may no longer be as def-
erential or intimidated, depending on 
one's point of view. During the Korean 
War, the Supreme Court struck down 
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President Truman's attempt to take over 
the steel mills. Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Simi-
larly, during the Vietnam War, the Court 
rejected an attempt by President Nixon 
to suppress publication of a classified 
study of that war [the Pentagon Papers], 
despite the Government's claim that re-
lease of the papers posed a grave and im-
mediate danger to the security of the 
United States. New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
One of the most interesting things to 
note about both those cases is that they 
reveal that claims of emergency cannot 
always be taken at face value. For exam-
ple, President Truman had announced 
that, "any stoppage of steel production 
would immediately place the Nation in 
peril." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 
U.s. at _ ( Vinson, c.J., dissenting). 
Nonetheless, despite the steelworkers go-
ing on strike for fifty-three days follow-
ing the Court's ruling, there was no steel 
shortage or harm to the war effort. See 
generally M. Marcus, Truman and the Steel 
Seizure Case (1977). 
Similarly, the Government declared 
that publication of the Pentagon Papers 
would create a "grave and immediate 
danger to the security of the United 
States." Brief for the United States, in New 
Yark Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 
(1971), at 7. Again, history does not reveal 
that any danger resulted other than the 
"embarrassment" of the Government pre-
dicted by Justice Douglas (''The dominant 
purpose of the First Amendment was to 
prohibit the widespread practice of gov-
ernmental suppression of embarrassing 
information." New York Times Co.,403 U.S. 
at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring». 
We, as lawyers and as citizens, need to 
maintain a difficult balance between pa-
triotism and skepticism. The horrors of 
September 11 must never be repeated, 
and it falls to the Federal Government in 
general and the President, in particular, 
to accomplish this formidable task. 
At the same time, we must ensure that 
our democratic system of government is 
protected. Justice Felix Frankfurter stated 
that it was" absurd" to worry that Harry 
Truman, that "representative product of 
the sturdy democratic traditions of the 
Mississippi V alley," would become a dic-
tator. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 
U.s. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
Nonetheless, Frankfurter warned, "The 
accretion of dangerous power does not 
come in a day. It does come, however 
slowly, from the generative force of 
unchecked disregard of the restrictions 
that fence in even the most disinterest-
ed assertion of authority." 
There is one final peril of which we 
must be aware. It almost seems unfair 
that we confront those who killed thou-
sands of innocent civilians, who rejoice 
at destruction and heartache, while we 
attempt to follow the commands of our 
own Constitution. Nevertheless, as Jus-
tice Frank Murphy wrote in 1946, the bru-
tality and ruthlessness of those we oppose 
cannot, "justify the abandonment of our 
devotion to justice ... To conclude other-
wise is to admit that the enemy has lost 
the battle but has destroyed our ideals." 
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (Mur-
phy, J., dissenting). to 
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